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VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF AN EMPLOYER FOR AN
ASSAULT BY HIS SERVANT: A SURVEY OF




The doctrine of respondeat superior has long been entrenched in
Anglo-American jurisprudence' and has even been traced by some to
ancient Greek and Roman laws. 2 It is a rule of law which did not
evolve over a long period of time, giving and bending so as to conform
with the social and economic needs of different eras, but instead ap-
peared on the scene in full bloom.8 It is under this doctrine that
principals, masters and employers throughout the years have been held
liable for the wrongs of those individuals working under them who
acted within the scope of their employment. The doctrine has been
applied to all injury producing acts of the employee, whether negligent
or intentional.4 The present conflict in Texas concerning an employer's
liability for the intentional torts of his employee is the subject of this
article.
EARLY TEXAS CASES
The idea than an employer is liable for the intentional torts of his
employee appears so well settled in our legal system that some may
question the need for a law review article on the subject. Indeed, the
principle has been followed in Texas courts for so long that in many
of our earliest cases it was merely a question of fact for the jury to
determine if the particular servant was acting pursuant to his employer's
orders, express or implied, or in furtherance of the master's business
so as to encumber the employer with the responsibility of the act in
question. In most of these cases, the master could escape liability only
by showing that the employee was satisfying his own vindictive interests
and therefore acting outside the scope of his employment. Several of
*Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University. B.A., University of Texas; J.D.,
St. Mary's University; M.C.L. Southern Methodist University; Fulbright Scholar, 1965-66.
1 Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Willful Torts of His Servant, 45 CH.-KENT
L. REv. 1 (1968).
20. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw LEcruRE 1 (1881).
8 A. CONARD AND R. KNAUSS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
(3d ed. 1965).
4 Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Zantzinger, 93 Tex. 64, 53 S.W. 379 (1899).
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these early authorities were cited in a Texas case decided some forty
years ago in which the rule was stated:
[T]he master will not be held responsible if it appears that the act
which occasioned the injury was done by the servant solely because
of resentment of an insult or bad feeling and not done in the doing
of what the servant was employed to do.5
The court, however, further stated:
[A] tort of the servant is deemed to be within the scope of his
employment, and imputable to the master, when the servant makes
an assault upon the aggrieved party as the result of a quarrel which
immediately grew out of the performance of the duties the servant
was employed to do.6
Vicarious liability was to be imposed if the servant was in some way
furthering his master's business, but not if the employee was acting on
his own. Which sphere the actor was occupying at the time of the con-
duct in question was left for the jury's determination.
The rule reached its apex in 1948, when the Texas Supreme Court
decided the case of Houston Transit Co. v. Felder.7 Plaintiff's car col-
lided with the rear of the defendant's bus driven by Goodson. Pursuant
to express instructions Goodson left the bus in order to obtain plain-
tiff's name and license number. After an exchange of words, Goodson
struck the plaintiff in the face with his changebox. The trial court
awarded plaintiff $1,000 damages but, on appeal, the supreme court
held that the plaintiff could not recover if Goodson struck plaintiff
solely because of personal resentment. In effect the court held that plain-
tiff could recover only by showing that Goodson was acting within the
scope of his employment in committing the act in question. Whether
he was placating his own emotions or was furthering his master's in-
terests was to be left to the jury.8
Hagenloh AND THE "RULE OF FORCE"
The confusion and difficulty which gave impetus for this article arose
some four years later when the supreme court decided Texas & P. Ry.
v. Hagenloh.9 The court greatly restricted the rule that had been in
5Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Cobb, 45 S.W.2d 323, 326 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1931,
writ dism'd).
old. at 326.
7 146 Tex. 428, 208 S.W.2d 880 (1948).
8 Id. at 431, 208 S.W.2d at 882. "What motivated Goodson in striking Felder was for
the jury to appraise."
9 151 Tex. 191, 247 S.W.2d 236 (1952).
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force for years by employing the "rule of force" and holding that be-
fore an employer could be vicariously liable for the assault and battery
of his servant, he must have authorized the act either expressly or
impliedly by placing the individual in a position which involved the
use of physical force.
Plaintiff, Hagenloh, was employed as a baggageman by the defendant
railroad and defendant, Houghland, was employed to investigate claims
for the same railroad. The incident in question arose after a passen-
ger had reported certain pieces of jewelry missing from her luggage.
Houghland was assigned to the case and while questioning plaintiff
an argument ensued. Plaintiff called Houghland a liar and Houghland
countered by striking plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit against the
railroad and the trial court awarded him $7,400 in damages. The court
of civil appeals affirmed and the case was appealed to the supreme court
where the principal question to be decided was whether Houghland
was acting within the scope of his employment, thereby imposing vicar-
ious liability upon the defendant when he struck plaintiff.
In denying recovery the court noted that as a general rule an assault
and battery committed by an employee upon a third person is usually
an expression of personal animosity and not done for the purpose of
furthering the employer's business. In order to hold a master liable
under these circumstances it must be shown that he authorized the act
by placing the individual in a position which required the use of force.10
The court explained:
The nature of the employment may be such as necessarily to in-
volve at times the use of force, as where the employee's duty is to
guard the employer's property and to protect it from trespassers,
so that the act of using force may be in furtherance of the em-
ployer's business, making him liable even when greater force is
used than is necessary."
The majority of the court reasoned that plaintiff, by not showing that
Houghland's position was one contemplating the use of force, failed to
prove a fact essential to his recovery.
He [Houghland] was investigating for the purpose of finding prop-
erty missing from baggage. His duties in that respect were not of
such nature as to involve the use of force, and there is no evidence
in the record tending to prove that he was authorized to use force
in the performance of those duties. And so it seems that in this
10 Id. at 197, 247 S.W.2d at 239.
11 Id. at 197, 247 S.W.2d at 239.
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respect respondent failed to prove a fact essential to recovery by
him against petitioner.
• ..when we look to all of the evidence bearing upon Hough-
land's conduct in relation to respondent, what was done and what
was said, we believe the only reasonable conclusion is that in
accosting and striking [Hagenloh] Houghland was not acting in
furtherance of petitioner's business, but was carrying on an enmity
that had developed between him and respondent, provoking a
quarrel with respondent to gratify personal animosity, and that
his acts were not for his employer, but were personal to him.12
The effect of this case was to greatly restrict the rule which imposed
vicarious liability upon the employer for the assault of his employee.
Plaintiffs now had to allege and prove that the servant's position was
one that permitted the use of force. If not, there was no recovery.1
The dissent noted that the court had departed from the previous rule
citing Houston Transit Co. v. Felder,14 "the most impressive negation
of the idea that there must be some authority to use force before an as-
sault and battery can be within the scope of authority."'15
It appears the Supreme Court of Texas took the scope of employment
test of Felder and attached a restriction to it to the effect that the use
of force had to be incidental to the individual's employment before
vicarious liability could be imposed upon a defendant employer. Ac-
cordingly, not only did an employee have to be acting within the scope
of his employment, i.e., in some way furthering his master's business,
when he struck plaintiff, his position also had to be one which con-
templated the use of physical force. If these two requirements for re-
covery were not alleged and proved by plaintiff the defendant employer
would escape liability.
It would seem that, notwithstanding this restriction, the rule was
clear and firmly established as precedent for all future cases involving
the issue of an employee's assault. This however has not been true.
There has been a conflict in our Texas cases since the Hagenloh deci-
sion which has resulted from the fact that some cases have cited Hagen.
loh and followed its "rule of force" to the letter while others have
12 Id. at 198, 247 S.W.2d at 240 (emphasis added).
13 This was expressly ointed out in the dissent of the Hagenloh case when Justice Smith
said: "We understand the majority opinion to say, in effect, that an employer can never
be liable for an assault and battery committed by his employee unless the employee acts
pursuant to an authority, general or limited, which permits the use of physical force to
some degree." Texas & P. Ry. v. Hagenloh, 151 Tex. 191, 203, 247 S.W.2d 236, 243 (1952)
(dissenting opinion).
14 146 Tex. 428, 208 S.W.2d 880 (1948).
15 Texas & P. Ry. v. Hagenloh, 151 Tex. 191, 203, 247 S.W.2d 236, 243 (1952) (dissenting
opinion).
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cited Hagenloh but appear to have applied the scope of employment
rule as stated in Felder. Some cases have not cited Hagenloh at all. A
discussion of these various lines of cases should be enlightening upon
the present status of the law.
CASES CITING Hagenloh THAT FOLLOWED ITS "RULE OF FORCE"
The first case to cite Hagenloh and follow its "rule of force" was
McCord v. Southern Distributing Co.16 decided in 1962. The defendant
distributing company, dealer for Falstaff beer in Travis County, hired
Schmidt as its "good will man." His duties were to create good will
by visiting taverns and buying Falstaff beer for patrons, and by placing
advertisements in package stores. The plaintiff was the owner of a liquor
store in Austin. He was acquainted with Schmidt and at one time had
had a Falstaff advertisement in his window but had removed it. Schmidt
called upon plaintiff and raised the possibility of replacing the Falstaff
sign. When the plaintiff refused, a discussion ensued which resulted
in the plaintiff being physically assaulted by Schmidt. The trial court
awarded plaintiff $7,000 in damages from Schmidt but held the em-
ployer not liable. The court of civil appeals affirmed, citing Hagenloh.
The court reasoned the defendant company could not be vicariously
liable because Schmidt's employment did not contemplate the use of
force.
Our decision is based solely on the ground that Schmidt in the
performance of his duties as appellee's employee was not author-
ized to use any degree of force in their performance. This, the use
of force, we understand to be an essential requirement of liability
of an employer for an assault by an employee, even though the em-
ployee at the time of the assault was engaged in furthering the
business of his employer.17
The court concluded there was no evidence that Schmidt was authorized
to use force in the performance of his duties as good will man for
appellees; even his title refuted the idea. In reaching its decision, the
court stated: "We follow Hagenloh and its 'rule of force.'"18
Four years later another court of civil appeals in Dart v. Yellow Cab,
Inc.'9 denied the plaintiff recovery from an employer for an assault and
battery committed by an employee. In this case the plaintiff, while
16 356 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, no writ).
17 Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
18 Id. at 353.
19 401 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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intoxicated, boarded one of the defendant's cabs and was driven to his
home by the defendant's employee. The plaintiff did not pay because
he had no money, and as a result of the argument that followed the
driver hit the plaintiff in the head with a flashlight and left the scene.
The court cited Hagenloh and held that to establish vicarious liability
for an intentional tort the plaintiff must prove that the particular
employment contemplated the use of force and that the employee was
furthering his master's business at the time of the assault.20
Applying this test the court denied plaintiff's recovery, stating:
It is undisputed that neither Lester nor any cab driver of the de-
fendant company was authorized to use force to collect fares ...
Obviously, the use of force is directly contrary to the successful
operation of such a business.... Even though one of his duties
was to collect fares, the assault was not part of this authorized
duty. In committing the assault, Lester was not carrying out his
employer's business. The assault was the act of the employee and
cannot be said to be the act of his employer.21
In following the precedent established by Hagenloh, these two cases
make clear that in order for an individual to recover from an employer
for the assault of one of his servants, the plaintiff must establish that
the employee's position was one which contemplated the use of force
and that the employee at the time of the assault was furthering his
master's business. Other cases, however, have clouded the clarity of
this rule.
CASES CITING Hagenloh BUT APPLYING
THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT RULE OF Felder
Five cases have cited Hagenloh yet applied the scope of employment
rule of Felder. In Norris v. China Clipper Cafe,22 the court of civil
appeals reversed the trial court and held the employer not liable. Plain-
tiff's wedding party was celebrating at defendant's cafe when a dispute
arose between plaintiff and one of the defendant's waitresses. The
plaintiff proceeded to call the waitress some derogatory names and a
fight erupted between the two women which resulted in plaintiff's in-
juries. The court of civil appeals cited Hagenloh and Felder but pro-
ceeded to base their decision on a much earlier case which reiterated
20 Id. at 877.
21 Id. at 877.
22 256 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the old scope of employment rule.23 This earlier case cited Central
Motor Co. v. Gallo24 as authority for the following rule:
The real test of the master's liability is not whether the servant's
employment contemplated the use of force ... but whether the act
complained of arose directly out of and was done in the prosecution
of the business that the servant was employed to do.25
Four years after the Norris case, the Texas Supreme Court decided
Smith v. M System Food Stores.26 In this case the defendant, M System
Food Stores, had employed James, a regular member of the San Angelo
police force, on a part-time basis to protect its property from theft by
shoplifters. During business hours James detected a Mrs. Johnson in
the act of shoplifting. He followed her out into the street, placed her
under arrest and escorted her to the manager's office. The woman con-
fessed to the offense and returned the stolen goods. At this point plain-
tiff, his wife, and Mrs. Johnson's husband came into the office protesting
her arrest. Words between the plaintiff and James ended when James
struck plaintiff on the head with his pistol, placed him under arrest
and had him transported to the city jail. The court of civil appeals
reversed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff.2 7 The supreme
court affirmed, reasoning that at the time of the assault James was not
doing an act which he was employed to do but instead acted out of
personal resentment.
The conclusion is quite obvious that the officer, James, struck the
petitioner, Smith, because he resented that statement and possibly
the tone of voice and manner in which the statement was made.
As inexcusable and uncalled for as this assault would seem to be,
we see no connection between the assault upon petitioner or his
arrest and the purpose of James' employment by the M System
Store.28
The supreme court cited Hagenloh but never mentioned its "rule
of force" and based its decision on Home Telephone & Electric Co. v.
23 Id. at 667. The case on which they based their opinion was Greathouse v. Texas
Pub. Util. Corp., 217 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24 94 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1936, no writ).
25 Greathouse v. Texas Pub. Util. Corp., 217 S.W.2d 190, 192 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasis added).
26156 Tex. 484, 297 S.W.2d 112 (1957).
27 M System Food Stores v. Smith, 293 S.W.2d 215, 218 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1956).
aff'd, 156 Tex. 484, 297 S.W.2d 112 (1957).
28 Smith v. M System Food Stores, 156 Tex. 484, 486, 297 S.W.2d 112, 113 (1957).
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Branton29 which was decided twenty-four years before Hagenloh. There
the court had stated:
[W]here the act of the servant is not in the furtherance of the
master's business, or for the accomplishment of the object for
which he was employed, but is performed as a resentment of in-
sults, or in furtherance of personal animosities of the servant, the
master is not liable30
The Smith case was followed by Humbert v. Adams. 1' The plaintiff
an inspector employed by the Texas Highway Department, inspected
some materials to be used by the defendant and complained to the
defendant construction firm that they were not suitable. An argument
ensued between one of the defendant's employees and plaintiff which
resulted in the assault. In denying recovery the court specifically cited
Hagenloh but applied the scope of employment rule in Felder. The
court said:
[W]e must hold that . . . Sears at the time of the assault on
Humbert was not acting within the scope of his employment
with defendant Adams.
The assault arose out of a personal resentment on Sears' [defen-
dant's employee] part against Humbert [plaintiff]. Sears was not
in the course of his employment with Adams [defendant] when the
assault was committed. If there was any connection at all between
theassault and the alleged failure of some materials not "passing
the specifications," that connection ... was too remote to be con-
sidered a part of the assault.82
Once again the plaintiff was denied recovery not because the occupa-
tion was one which did not contemplate the "use of force" but on the
basis that the employee at the time was not acting within the scope of
his employment; he was furthering his own interests.
Six years later the same court decided Sheffield v. Central Freight
Lines.3 The plaintiff, a truck driver employed by Red Arrow Freight
Lines, was in the process of backing up to a loading dock when he hit
one of the defendant's trucks. After an argument the defendant's driver,
Jarvis, assaulted plaintiff. The court of civil appeals affirmed, citing
29 7 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1928), aff'd on other grounds, 23 S.W.2d 294
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted).
30 Id. at 629.
31 361 S.W.2d 458 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no writ).
82 Id. at 460.
33435 S.W.2d 954 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, no writ).
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Home Telephone & Electric Co. v. Branton 4 as authority, reasoning
that the argument between plaintiff and Jarvis was the result of per-
sonal animosities between the parties. Thus the individuals involved
were not furthering their master's business and were not within the
scope of their employment.
[T]he acts of the participants were motivated, not by any sense of
duty to their respective employers, not by any desire to promote
or further their employer's business or property interests, but
wholly by their personal animosities. 5
The court cited Hagenloh but nothing was said of its "rule of force."
The last case in this category is Bradford v. Fort Worth Transit Co0 6
decided in 1970. In this case defendant's bus driver, upon being at-
tacked by a group of boys, pulled out a gun and killed plaintiff's son.
The court of civil appeals, citing Greathouse v. Texas Public Utilities
Corp.,8 7 affirmed for the defendant. The case cited was decided before
Hagenloh and states the following proposition:
It is very clear ... that to hold the master liable for the tort of
his servant, certain things must appear: (a) The tortious act must
have arisen in the performance of a duty of the servant under the
authority conferred upon him; (b) it must have been in the fur-
therance of the master's business; (c) and negatively, the servant
must not have stepped aside from his master's business to engage
in a mission of his own.88
The court in Bradford cited Hagenloh, not for its rule of force, but
for the proposition that when a servant steps outside the scope of his
employment the duration of such a mission is not a determining factor
in establishing the employer's vicarious liability.
The above discussion illustrates two aspects of the conflict in our
Texas cases. Hagenloh made it reasonably clear that in order to impose
vicarious liability on an employer for an assault and battery by his
employee it must be shown that the employment in question was one
which reasonably contemplated the use of force. This "rule of force"
was followed in two decisions, but five subsequent cases, including one
decided by the Supreme Court of Texas, paid only lip service to the
Hagenloh decision. Although they all cited it as authority, the courts
347 S.W.2d 627 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1928), aff'd on other grounds, 23 S.W.2d 294
(rex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgrnt adopted).
35 Sheffield v. Central Freight Lines, 435 S.W.2d 954, 956 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968,
no writ).
36 450 S.W.2d 919 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87 217 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38 Id. at 197.
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continued to base their decisions on the scope of employment rule
espoused in Felder. The conflict is made more ambiguous because two
cases involving the vicarious liability of a master for the assault of his
employee have been decided since Hagenloh without citing it at all.
CASES NOT CITING Hagenloh
H. T. Cab Co: v. Ginns89 was decided by the Galveston Court of Civil
Appeals in 1955, three years after the Hagenloh decision. The plaintiff's
decedent, Ginns, was a passenger in one of defendant's cabs, driven by
Jones. Upon arrival at his destination, Ginns gave the driver an amount
of money which was fifteen cents short of the fare. The driver became
so infuriated that he pulled out a gun and shot Ginns, causing his death.
Affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, the Galveston court stated:
[The driver] was . . . acting in the course and scope of his em-
ployment in undertaking to collect a fare from Ginns, and during
the existence of the carrier-passenger relationship. We do not ques-
tion that in shooting Ginns, [he] was humoring his own spite. That
does not change the fact that the trouble arose out of collecting
a fare, and during the carrier-passenger relationship. 40
The court made no reference to Hagenloh or its "rule of force."
The supreme court found no reversible error, causing Justice Hughes
of the Austin Court of Civil Appeals to remark:
We do not know upon what ground the Supreme Court approved
the judgment in that case. Maybe the cab driver had the right to
use force in collecting his fares.41
In light of Dart v. Yellow Cab, Inc.42 and Bradford v. Fort Worth
Transit Co.,43 H. T. Cab Co. cannot be distinguished on the basis
that a carrier-passenger relationship was involved. It is merely an in-
stance in which the court did not follow the precedent established by
the supreme court in Hagenloh.
Adami v. Dobie44 was decided in 1969 by the San Antonio Court of
Civil Appeals. Plaintiff brought suit against the father and mother of
89 280 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40 Id. at 365.
41 McCord v. Southern Distrib. Co., 356 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962,
no writ).
42 401 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43 450 S.W.2d 919 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44 440 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ dism'd).
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Kenneth Adami who had shot plaintiff's husband while he was on
defendants' ranch. Kenneth had been instructed to look after the land
and see that the gates were kept closed. Plaintiff's husband drove his
truck through the Adami ranch and left a gate open. Kenneth followed
him to get the license number for the purpose of identification. A
confrontation ensued; Kenneth approached the truck and shot the de-
cedent. The court failed to cite either Felder or Hagenloh, holding for
the defendants on the ground that Kenneth was not within the scope
of his employment at the time he did the act in question.
While it is true that a-master may be liable for a wilful wrong
committed by his servant, such liability attaches only when the
servant, in the commission of such wilful wrong was acting within
the scope of his employment for the benefit of the master (citation
omitted). A master not liable for unauthorized intended tortious
conduct of his servant, even when the act was done in connection
with the servant's employment, where the wrongful act was unex-
pectable, in view of the duties of the servant (citation omitted).
The commission of a deadly assault is not a customary way of per-
forming a duty which involves seeing "about gates being closed."
In this case, the act of the servant was performed some two miles
from the place where it was his duty to see that gates were closed;
the use of force was not expectable by the master; the act of follow-
ing people for the purpose of taking down license numbers was not
an act of the kind Kenneth was employed to perform; the testimony
shows that Kenneth was acting out of purely personal motives....
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Kenneth's con-
duct was of the same general nature as that authorized, or inci-
dental to the conduct authorized.
45
Again the court chose not to follow Hagenloh and its "rule of force,"
but elected instead to base its decision on whether or not the employee
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the assault.
CONCLUSION
The above case analyses point out that Texas courts have applied
two conflicting tests in determining the liability of an employer for
an assault committed by his employee. It was thought that the supreme
court had finally settled the issue with the determination of Hagenloh
and its "rule of force." However, the majority of post-Hagenloh cases,
45 Id. at 333.
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including the only supreme court decision in the field, have merely
paid Hagenloh lip service and followed the scope of employment test
of Felder and other pre-Hagenloh cases. These cases have diluted the
efficacy of the "rule of force" test and it appears that Texas courts will
continue the trend of the most recent cases and follow the older scope
of employment test.
